

STAT

Approved For Release 2003/05/15 : CIA-RDP78-04007A001100010006-3

Approved For Release 2003/05/15 : CIA-RDP78-04007A001100010006-3

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director of Security

DATE: 8 September 1954

FROM : Chief, Inspection Staff

SUBJECT: Comments Relative to the Inspector General's Report of 23 July 1954 Re Inspection Staff of the Security Office.

I. The recommendation that the Inspection Division be changed to an Inspection Staff was complied with on 29 July 1954.

II. The recommendation that an over-all survey be conducted relative to the Agency's unlisted telephones is currently in the process of being implemented. An inspection of the unlisted telephones within the Agency was begun by the Inspection Staff on 19 August and is presently fifty per cent completed. The survey is being closely coordinated with the Physical Security Branch who conduct initial inquiries upon the receipt of each request for an unlisted telephone.

A. A detailed survey was conducted by the Inspection Staff and recommendations made in July 1953 relative to the general security status of all Agency telephone facilities and services, which included a section pertaining to "unlisted telephones."

B. With regard to the recommendation that a closer control be maintained over the issuance of badges and/or limited passes to non-agency representatives, the Inspection Staff is responsible for monitoring all visitors within the CIA buildings who are not citizens of the USA. This includes those foreign nationals visiting the Agency as well as those assigned in a liaison capacity. Security Office name checks are conducted and if derogatory information is developed, it is immediately furnished to the DD/S, C/SRS, C/AAS and C/Operations Branch for transmittal to the interested desk. Request for limited passes for liaison representatives are received from the office to which the visitor is to be assigned. Biographical data is required and National Agency, RI and K checks initiated. If DD/P components cannot be persuaded to use a limited building badge then the Inspection Staff assists in obtaining a "Special Privilege Security Pass," non-photographic. Attention is called to Regulation [redacted] and the latitude given the DD/P and Staff C pertaining to the release of classified information to Foreign Nationals.

C. In December 1951, after a detailed survey by the Inspection Staff wherein an actual counter-penetration of the buildings was conducted, recommendations were made and a new badge system instituted.

III. The question of coordinating the inspectional jurisdictional responsibilities between the Physical Security Branch and the Inspection Staff has been resolved. The functions of the Physical Security Branch are clearly defined and require the Physical Security Branch to conduct physical security surveys of current or proposed projects or buildings; submit recommendations and assist in expediting their implementation.

The Inspection Staff concerns itself with conducting detailed security inspections of an installation after it is in operation to insure that over-all security safeguards and procedures are being utilized and that the recommendations made by the Physical Security Branch have been implemented; and to present recommendations for any additional security safeguards required. All such work is closely coordinated with Physical Security and often one of their representatives is invited to participate in local inspections as are Security Officers from Logistics, and TSS when relevant.

IV. Reference is made to that section of the IG's report dealing with the emergency destruction plan on a world wide basis. The Agency's Emergency Planning Officer has been assigned the task of coordinating with the various desks under the DD/P complex in an effort to establish the current planning program. A progress report was submitted 24 August.

A. While the Inspection Staff has not been specifically assigned the task of conducting a world wide survey of foreign missions and stations to insure that a workable destruction plan is in operation, the existence of an emergency evacuation and destruction plan is always of paramount concern and receives a high priority in all inspection surveys conducted by the Inspection Staff.

25X1A9A

IS/SO/DEW/HT:ds (8 September 1954)